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Abstract
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the civic space until a century ago, the paradigmatic citizen has been constructed as male. Since
enfranchisement, women have been wrestling with the phrase ‘women and citizenship’. For men, the and
is read as conjunctive; for women, it remains disjunctive.
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Rapunzel and the lure
of equal citizenship1
Margaret Thornton
Introduction: the universal fantasy
While ‘the citizen’ is believed to signify the universal, there is no universal sex. Because men monopolised the civic space until a century
ago, the paradigmatic citizen has been constructed as male. Since enfranchisement, women have been wrestling with the phrase ‘women
and citizenship’. For men, the and is read as conjunctive; for women,
it remains disjunctive.
Kant’s distinction between active and passive citizens underscores
the different meanings this gendered and connotes. The characteristics
of an active citizen, according to Kant, are freedom, equality and independence (1785 [1991]: 126). Prior to First Wave Feminism, most
(white) male citizens satisfied, or at least had the potential to satisfy,
the criteria for active citizenship, but no women did. Women were consigned to the passive category, together with children and men without
agency, such as domestic servants and apprentices: they were all ‘mere
underlings [Handlanger] of the commonwealth’ because they lacked
‘civil independence’ (Kant 1785 [1991]: 126) in that they had to be
under the direction or protection of others. Nevertheless, Kant was of
the view that the passive designation seemed to contradict the very
concept of citizenship (126), which suggests active participation of
some kind. This ontological doubt seems to have affected the transition from the passive to the active category for women. It would seem
Law Text Culture Vol 8 20040000
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to be even more marked in the case of Indigenous people, men as well
as women, who were denied even the passive descriptor until well into
the 20th century, suggesting that the category of ‘indigenous subjects’
was more accurate (Peterson & Sanders 1998: 7). These distinct gradations of meaning within the rubric of citizenship clearly challenge
its claim to universality. As Margaret Somers points out, there is a
certain ‘structural shallowness’ (1994: 64) associated with the use of
the term by political theorists. Nevertheless, the assumption of the universality of citizenship is pervasive.
First Wave Feminism tended to accept the lure of universal. In the
late 19th century, women generally wanted to be ‘let in’ to the community of active citizens with its promise of freedom, equality and independence. They wanted to exercise the same civil rights as men, as
well as to be admitted to universities, the professions and public office. Sameness was attractive because of the very low base from which
women, particularly married women, began their struggle in light of
the prevailing common law constraints. On marriage, a woman entered into a state of coverture, which meant that she was deemed to be
under the cover, or wing, of her husband. In practice, this meant that
she was denied all civil rights, including the right to enter into contracts and own property. When she became ‘Mrs John Smith’, she lost,
not just her name, but also her identity as a person. As the 18th century
jurist, William Blackstone, famously put it: the two became one and
that one was the husband.2 I suggest that the metaphysical notion of
the indivisibility of the union of marriage that crystallised into the identity of the husband under coverture continues to detract from the idea
that women are full citizens today, despite the reforms that have been
effected.
I do not propose to traverse in any detail the well-trodden ground
dealing with either the history of letting women into the community of
Equals (Oldfield 1992), or citizenship as a legal concept (eg Rubenstein
2000, 2002), but to consider why citizenship continues to be such a
highly problematic and ambiguous concept for women. It can readily
be seen that the formal emancipatory changes that were effected in
Australia, as in the West more generally, did not automatically give
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rise to the acceptance of women as active citizens. Although enfranchisement is an important symbol of citizenship and full equality between the sexes (MacKenzie 2002: 30), it is not in fact synonymous
with active citizenship. Indeed, a reductive approach towards enfranchisement enabled it to be interpreted as merely enabling women to
place a ballot in a ballot box, not to confer on them the same civil
rights that young men automatically attained at the age of majority.
Every right had to be fought for separately by women, usually on a
State-by-State basis. As feminist theorists have shown, the citizenship
mosaic is still being assembled, at the same time that it is being corroded by postmodern critiques (Sypnowich 1993).
The resistance towards women moving from the category of passive to active citizens has been striking, albeit not surprising. How
could women remain in the position of subordinated Others if it were
formally recognised that they possessed independent wills — just like
Benchmark Men — that is, those who are white, Anglo-Celtic, heterosexual, able-bodied and middle-class?3 Agency and equal treatment
would have to follow in accordance with the Kantian construction.
Hence, the conferral of rights by masculinist legislatures and courts
has been grudging so that each right becomes a site of contestation for
years afterwards. Benchmark Men have been parsimonious in sharing
power and authority in order to preserve their superiority and
normativity. The liberal nation-state, the creation of Benchmark Men,
certainly not women or Others (Grimshaw et al 1994, Magarey et al
1993) has been assiduous in supporting formal equality for women
and Others in accordance with the neutral, inclusive and universal veneer of citizenship. The substantive reality is somewhat different.
The issue of political representation graphically illustrates the point.
The right to be elected to parliament and to represent others, a key
right of the universal citizen, was separated from women’s right to
vote in most Australian States from the outset (Thornton 1995). Even
when legislation granted the right to representation at the same time as
the grant of the franchise, as occurred in the case of the Commonwealth (Commonwealth Franchise Act 1902), it was a very long time
before a woman was in fact elected — more than 40 years in fact —
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when Dame Enid Lyons was elected in 1943.4 Even then, it should be
noted that her election was boosted by the fact that she was the widow
of Prime Minister Joseph Lyons, who died in office in 1939. The ‘halo
effect’ emanating from an authoritative man seemed to confer the seal
of approval on her, as was the case for most other women candidates
until relatively recently (Sawer & Simms 1993: 75).
The idea that women have a right to represent the general interests
of the population as a whole, as opposed to the averred particularity of
women’s interests, has been a notable impediment on the rocky road
from passive to active citizenship. As recently as 1959, the right of two
women to stand for election to the South Australian Legislative Council
was challenged on the basis of sex (R v Hutchins). This challenge
occurred 65 years after South Australia’s path breaking legislation,
one of the first instances in the world of female enfranchisement, which,
like that of the Commonwealth, simultaneously conferred the right to
vote and the right to stand for election (Constitution Amendment Act
1894 (SA)). While the challenge was unsuccessful, the very fact that it
was initiated underscores my point about the elusiveness of active
citizenship for women. Despite the universality of citizenship discourse,
women’s association with particularity, which seems to have been
interpreted as those activities in which men did not engage — most
notably having babies and caring for them — has enabled the social
construction of women as being incapable of dispassionately attending
to matters of state (Pateman 1989: 17ff). Despite ongoing concerns
about the character of liberal democracy (Phillips 1992), the
comparatively low visibility of women in federal and State parliaments
today continues to underscore women’s marginality to the world of the
active citizen and the public sphere (eg Whip 2003, Summers 2003:
esp 199–224).
Other than in its limited passive sense of conferring an entitlement
to protection, the private sphere, the paradigmatic locus of the feminine, has generally been represented by key citizenship theorists as
though it were irrelevant (Walby 1994: 379, Somers 1993).5 The family, or the realm of necessity — involving reproduction and caring for
others, the activities required for the basic survival of the species — is
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constructed as antipathetic to those of the normative active citizen,
namely, Benchmark Man, who has been able to use his power to embed gendered constructions of citizenship within authoritative discourses. This is despite the sustained endeavours by feminist scholars
to expose the skewed nature of these discourses (eg Walby 1994, Riley
1992, Jones 1990, MacKinnon 1989, Minow 1985). Such constructions have served to underscore the congruence between universality
and masculinity, and the way that the feminine, indigeneity, lesbianism, disability and other non-dominant characteristics are relegated to
the realm of the Other, either at the fringes of the universal or outside
its boundaries altogether.
Traditionally, citizenship has purported to govern the relationship
between citizen and state in the public sphere, while the private sphere
is obscured from view, thereby rendering the citizen/state relationship
elusive and ambiguous for women and Others who lack public profiles. Civil litigation is one way in which issues are brought from the
private sphere into the public domain. Within judicial sites, ‘the citizen’ continues to be constituted in deeply gendered ways through ostensibly private litigation. The way courts continue to uphold the
Kantian binarism is nevertheless accorded short shrift in citizenship
discourse. As progressive critiques have long established, law is not
autonomous but deeply imbricated with prevailing political beliefs and
the dominant discourses of the society more generally (Kairys 1990).
With reference to selective Australian examples, I show how the judicial gendering of the citizen has constituted a sustained practice of
resistance in the struggle for independence by women.

Reading down the universal
The Persons’ Cases of the late 19th century graphically illustrate the
attempt to retain the masculinity of the universal so as to exclude
women, even if they were white, Anglo-Celtic, heterosexual, able-bodied and middle class, just like Benchmark Men. Sex constituted a disabling factor, so much so that the women who sought to be admitted to
the community of Equals, the preserve of active citizens, were deemed
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by gatekeepers to be non-persons for the purpose of holding office and
gaining entry to the universities or professions. A range of cases was
heard in the United Kingdom and Canada, as well as Australia, regarding the statutory interpretation of the word ‘person’ (Sachs & Wilson
1978, Mossman 1986). The legal profession, as the paradigmatic domain of rationality and authority, long remained a contested domain
regarding the entry of women.
Thus, when Ada Evans sought admission to the practice of law in
New South Wales in 1902 after graduating from law school, she was
refused entry by the judicial gatekeepers on the ground of her sex
(Thornton 1996: 56ff). Leaving aside the fact that Ada Evans satisfied
the formal criteria for admission, the limited impact of enfranchisement is also apparent. Although New South Welsh women had been
enfranchised at both federal and State levels in the same year, it clearly
was not construed as an indicator of active citizenship.
Edith Haynes was not permitted to sit for her intermediate examination in 1904 by the Barristers’ Board of Western Australia, even
though the Board had agreed that she be articled to her father a few
years before. When she appealed to the Supreme Court, relying on the
phrase ‘every person’ in the Legal Practitioners Act 1893 (WA), the
judges were of the view that the Act did not envisage that women could
become legal practitioners (In re Edith Haynes). They chose to ignore
the fact that (white) women had been enfranchised in Western Australia five years before, in 1899, as well as at the federal level in 1902.
Instead, the judges relied on a homogeneous view of the masculinist
legal world, which they sought to preserve by means of specious arguments, such as reliance upon the supposed intention of an Imperial Act
passed in 1831, long before the Western Australian Acts pertaining
either to legal practice or enfranchisement had been envisaged. In
Haynes, we can see how the social meaning of citizenship for women
was delimited by an authoritative judicial voice, which determined that
women lacked legal personhood when they sought to challenge male
monopolies in the professions and public office.
The courts did not succeed in excluding women permanently from
the legal profession, but they did obstruct and delay the process. Western
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Australian legislation was not enacted to admit women as legal
practitioners until 1923 and the first woman was not admitted to practice
until 1930, that is, 30 years after Edith Haynes’ attempt. In every State,
special legislation had to be fought for and enacted to enable admission;
sex-neutral language in the relevant legal profession Acts was deemed
to be inadequate (Thornton 1996: ch 2).
Even when women had been admitted to legal practice, formal attempts were made to delimit their authority. The case of Mary Kitson
(Tenison Woods) is illustrative (In re Kitson). She had been admitted
to practice in South Australia in 1916, but when she sought to be appointed as a notary public (a minor role involving the administration
of oaths and certification of documents) she was found not to satisfy
the test for inclusion in the universal ‘every person’. As with Haynes,
the legislature was found not to have intended that women be appointed
notary publics. The fact that the relevant Public Notaries Act had been
passed in 1859,6 long before enfranchisement and the admission of
women to universities and the legal profession, was deemed to be of
no consequence. Similarly, even the existence of an Acts Interpretation Act allowing words importing the masculine gender to be construed so as to include the feminine was insufficient to persuade the
judges when they encountered the pronoun ‘his’ in the Public Notaries
Act.7
Through time-honoured hermeneutic practices of adjudication, we
see how the universal is endowed with a totalising meaning equated
with the masculine, which has the effect of disparaging the feminine or
erasing it altogether. Litigation of the kind outlined, as well as the correlative campaigns for reform, illustrates how women had to struggle
to assert their personhood (Oldfield 1992). They were far from being
possessive individuals who could exercise free will and independence
as active citizens just because they were entitled to vote.
Of course, you might say, that was 100 years ago and things have
changed. Indeed, many things have, but one must be wary of adopting
a progressivist approach, which avers that things are always getting
better. Economic growth and the demand for more lawyers, rather than
social justice, have been the catalysts for the changing profile (Thornton
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1996: 268–75). Women now comprise more than 50 per cent of law
students and more than 30 per cent of the legal profession in Australia
(ABS 2003), as in other parts of the western world (Schultz & Shaw
2003: xxxv–xl), but are still not fully accepted as citizens of the jurisprudential community; a residual distrust of the feminine remains, particularly in authoritative positions. Thus only approximately 12 per
cent of partners in law firms are women, compared with 12 per cent of
barristers and 15 per cent of judges. Even more striking is the fact that
only about 3 per cent of women barristers have argued cases before the
High Court. Rather than being permitted to have ‘speaking parts’,
women are preferred as the aphasic ‘juniors’ to senior male barristers
(Kirby 1998, 2002). In contrast, when we look at the figures for employed solicitors, that is, ‘managed’ positions with little autonomy or
agency, we see that the percentage of women is a disproportionate 48
per cent (ABS 2003). Although there is no longer any formal barrier to
the ‘letting in’ of women to authoritative positions, the predominant
image of autonomous and rational manhood presents an invisible barrier. The dangerousness and irrationality conventionally associated with
female corporeality is apparent in the incidence of sexual harassment
in the legal profession (Brockman 2001: 114–24, Sommerlad & Sanderson 1998: 175–84, Thornton 1996: 253–62), which is invoked to
diminish the agency and autonomy of women lawyers, albeit rarely
articulated.
The profile of the legal profession reveals how the familiar gendered
pyramid of authority attaches itself to and shapes an occupation, to
which women are relative newcomers, no less than to more traditional
occupational areas (eg Game & Pringle 1983). Variations of this narrative could be told about the entry of women to other professions and to
universities, as well as to public life (Pringle 1998, Theobald 1996,
Oldfield 1992, Sawer & Simms 1993). My point is that being ‘let in’ is
by no means the end of the story, for entry has been grudging and
qualified. Even 100 years after First Wave Feminism, the acceptance
of women into authoritative positions is equivocal. The dominant social script chooses to depict the feminine association with affectivity,
corporeality and sexuality as being likely to exercise a corrupting and
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dangerous effect on the body politic (Hunt 1991), underpinning the
idea that women’s agency cannot be trusted. Hence, the socially preferred position for women in the public sphere is as ancillary aids to
important men. What is more, this relationship is believed to be
grounded in nature, for it mirrors popular understandings of heterosex,
with a dominant male and a subordinate female. While women constantly challenge this pattern of social relations, judges seek to instantiate it. Authoritative positions remain an ongoing site of contestation
for women everywhere in the struggle for independence and full citizenship. Perhaps, the most significant by-product of the under-representation of women in authoritative positions is that the dominant legal discourses remain irredeemably masculinist.

Sloughing off the seeds of passivity
Mesmerised by equality
The frustration arising from the injustice of exclusion, or quasiacceptance, has meant that equality with men has been a powerful
animating cry of the women’s movement. To understand the struggle
for equality as a visceral reaction against the way things are, rather
than an aspirational norm as to the way things ought to be, gives us a
window onto this problematic concept, about which women are
nevertheless so ambivalent. As well as constituting one of the
characteristics of active citizenship, equality is also a key prong of
liberal legalism in its formal incarnation (known variously as equality
before the law, procedural equality or equal treatment). The focus is on
sameness, which purports to treat characteristics of identity, including
sex, as irrelevant (Graycar & Morgan 2004). In other words, the
prevailing version of equality is one that comports with the universal
standard, which is designed to paper over differences so that they are
unseeable and depoliticised (Young 1989). A formalistic interpretation,
as we see with the ‘persons’ cases, camouflages the normative
preference for benchmark masculinity and the relegation of the feminine
to the status of disfavoured Other. It is in this way that the universal is
constructed so as to exercise a totalising effect.
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Equality is also epistemologically slanted towards benchmark masculinity by being confined to the public sphere, an idea that can be
traced back to Aristotle and the Greek democratic tradition. The polis
is where all citizens, restricted to free men, came together to deliberate
on matters of state. In contrast, the oikos, the private or domestic sphere,
was regarded as a sphere of inequality because it necessarily comprised a master who exercised power over subordinates — a wife, children and slaves (Aristotle 1959: §§1253b–1260b). This idea of the
male citizen as head of the household, or pater familias, continued to
be formally recognised by the state until comparatively recently. The
hierarchisation of spheres in which the public is privileged over the
private, has also formally gone. If anything, it has shifted the other
way because neoliberalism privileges the pursuit of private interests
over public good. However, this new incarnation of ‘private’ privileges the private sphere qua market, rather than the private sphere qua
family. The vestigial seeds of invidiousness nevertheless continue to
attach to the family with which women are indelibly associated within
Western political thought, a congruence that is constructed as detracting from active citizenship. Legal, as well as political discourse is discomforted by affectivity, corporeality and sexuality, although law selectively regulates family and intimate relationships (O’Donovan 1985,
Olsen 1983). The classical liberal position is that the private sphere
qua family is a space of respite and realisation of desire for (male)
citizens that is beyond law. 8 The privileging of the universal
(masculinist) prescripts has meant that the subjectivity of women and
Others is treated as though it were incidental, the exposure and critique of which has been a major project of feminist poststructural scholarship (eg Editorial 1993: 1).
‘The personal is the political’, the singular aphorism of the women’s
movement since the late 1960s, encapsulates the attempt to make public
what had long been concealed within the ‘hidden transcripts’9 of family
life — particularly gendered harms, such as domestic violence and
sexual assault. The idea that what occurs within the home is beyond
law has nevertheless been highly resistant to change. The Benchmark
Men of Law have acted as assiduous guardians of the public/private
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dichotomy within the liberal state. Only in 1991 did the Australian
High Court determine that the spousal immunity, which protected a
husband against a charge of raping his wife, be abolished (R v L; cf R
v R). Prior to that, the wife’s absence of consent was irrelevant. The
assumption was that her consent to the marriage was proof that she
consented to all subsequent acts of intercourse with the husband,
regardless of the circumstances. The vitiation of the wife’s free will on
marriage constitutes graphic evidence of her status as passive citizen
and inability to exercise agency.
This point is further illustrated by the juridical resistance to the
idea of a husband and wife entering into contracts with each other,
which necessitates two independent wills coming together (Balfour v
Balfour, Thornton 2001b). Of course, this would have been impossible at common law because the wife lacked the requisite will to contract with anyone, let alone her husband (Berkowitz & Thorne 1700
[1979]: 214f). The absorption of her will into his on marriage meant
that she became completely will-less. The vestigial construction of a
married woman as lacking an independent will continues to be invoked
(Shanley 1989: 46), which sustains her status as passive citizen. Correlative to the absence of will and the inability to enter into binding
contracts was the assumption that the wife was economically dependent on the husband. While women can no longer be assumed to be in
dependency relationships, the common law has continued to resist
moves towards independence. The shadows of coverture and its willless state remind women, particularly married women, that they have
not yet effectively made the transition to active citizenship.
The marriage discount
The ambivalence towards female independence is apparent in the
reluctance to do away with archaic laws, more appropriate to pre- rather
than post-modernity. An example is the so-called ‘marriage discount’
of tort law, as illustrated by the recent Australian High Court decision
of De Sales v Ingrilli (hereinafter De Sales). Although the majority
judges allowed the appeal by a Western Australian woman whose
damages had been reduced by $120,000, the cause of action itself was
not abolished.10
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The anachronistic principle underpinning the marriage discount allows damages paid to a widow arising from the wrongful death of her
husband to be ‘discounted’ if she is considered to have reasonable prospects of remarriage. Her prospects are determined by a judicial assessment of her looks, age and personality.11 Kirby J acknowledged that
there was a ‘distasteful’ element in having to weigh up a woman’s
marriage prospects (De Sales §148 per Kirby J), whereas McHugh J
(dissenting) gave the objection short shrift, pointing out that judges
have to assess damages in difficult areas, such as ‘mental impairment,
scarring or loss of libido or sexual function’ (De Sales §106, cf Callinan
J at §189). But such injuries are not commensurable, for the marriage
discount is gender specific, and parallels the gaze of the (heterosexual)
male judge. What would [he] see, we might ask, if he were to gaze
upon the body of a claimant widower? He would see a man who may
have suffered grief upon the death of his wife, but probably not one
who had lost his source of economic survival. Rather than looking at
an/Other from his elevated position of benchmark superiority, the judge
could be looking at a man who looked like [him/self]. Because of the
discomforting reflexivity, it is almost unthinkable to imagine the judge
seeking to gauge a widower’s remarriage prospects by subjectively
assessing his sexual attractiveness. In any case, reversing the sex of a
claimant is not rational because Benchmark Men as a class were never
assigned to the Kantian category of dependency, certainly not dependency on a wife. Indeed, coverture precluded such a possibility.
The infantilising effect of the assumption of dependency ensured
that women could never be possessive individuals at common law
(Davies & Naffine 2001: 15). Retention of the marriage discount clearly
runs counter to the idea of women becoming possessive individuals,
and hence active citizens in contemporary society. The conjunction of
the feminine and corporeality is also underscored by the marriage discount because of the manner in which remarriage prospects are assessed. The juridical construction of women as primarily embodied
and non-rational is contrasted with the rationality and responsibility of
the Benchmark Men of law, the paradigmatic inhabitants of the public
sphere and the triers of fact who are authorised to gauge a woman’s
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marriageability by gazing at her body. Reducing a woman to the status
of the objectified Other represents a graphic contemporary attempt to
reclaim and reify the increasingly friable line of demarcation between
it and the masculinist norm. As the active citizen has been historically
constructed as disembodied (Lister 2003, Lloyd 1984), corporealisation
effectively retards the transition of women from the passive category.
The ‘marriage discount’ is not the only example of residual legal
paternalism that could be said to constitute an impost on a married
woman’s free will, but it is a striking example. Other recent instances
that involve the vitiation or diminution of the will of the wife include
sexually transmitted debt (Fehlberg 1997, Thornton 1997). The Australian High Court has recently taken the view that wives are still in a
unique position of vulnerability by virtue of the marital relationship
(Garcia v National Australia Bank, based on the pre-World War II
decision of Yerkey v Jones). The effect of determining that a wife may
not be held liable for her husband’s debts as a result of a guarantee that
she has signed because of the likelihood that she would succumb to
pressure from her spouse is to construe her as less than fully autonomous, even though it may capture one dimension of reality. If women
in heterosexual relations are still constructed as having defective wills,
how can they present themselves in the public sphere or the labour
market as independent agents of rationality and legality, that is, as active citizens?

Corroding the public/private dichotomy
Deconstructing the myth of the autonomous worker
A major focus of Second Wave Feminism has been directed to
challenging the conditions on which women are ‘let in’ to public life
and the market. In late 20th century Australia, women were less starryeyed about the attractions of universality than their First Wave sisters,
for they recognised that formal equality with men was not enough (Lake
1999: 231ff). Anti-discrimination legislation is the most notable example
of a measure designed to counteract egregious instances of
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discrimination. No such concept as discrimination existed at common
law. Indeed, as already made clear, the common law tolerated and
perpetuated gross inequalities, regardless of sex (as well as race,
sexuality, disability, or any other attribute). Anti-discrimination
legislation proscribes discrimination on grounds such as these in the
context of recruitment and the terms and conditions of employment.
However, as I have argued elsewhere, the preference has been displayed
for a formal rather than a substantive understanding of equality in
accordance with the liberal norm (Thornton 1990). It is perhaps
unsurprising in light of the central argument of this paper that almost
every step in favour of active citizenship for women has been politically,
judicially and socially delimited.
To make out a case of direct discrimination, the complainant
generally has to establish that she was treated less favourably than a
man in the same or similar circumstances.12 The accommodation of
difference, such as caring responsibilities, constitutes a virtually
insuperable hurdle for complainants. ‘Women’s work’ that is reflective
of what women do in the home is particularly problematic. In addition
to the issue of comparability, the legal line of separation between public
and private life, which underpins anti-discrimination legislation and
liberal legalism generally, has operated to cordon off the domestic sphere
from scrutiny in the age-old way. Hence, despite feminism’s best
endeavours, the symbiotic link between private and public spheres,
which has sustained Benchmark Men and enabled them to become
active citizens, has remained intractable to change through antidiscrimination legislation. Harking back to Aristotle again, male citizens
have been free to participate in the public life of the citizen because
women and subordinated others have taken the preponderance of
responsibility for the world of necessity — reproduction and caring
for others, including adult men perfectly able to care for themselves.
By and large, equality has substantive meaning within the public sphere
for women today only if they enter on the same terms as men, that is,
as free and autonomous individuals. However, the majority of women
are not free, at least for part of their lives, for reproductive and caring
responsibilities render them connected and unfree. When the masculinist
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standards of equality are applied to them, they are also found wanting,
for they are not similarly situated to their comparators — Benchmark
Men. I illustrate the proposition by reference to the case of Schou v
State of Victoria (hereinafter Schou), in which the complainant directly
challenged the public/private dichotomy, as well as the assumption
that the normative worker is autonomous and free.
The Schou case involved a woman who was employed as a Hansard
reporter and sub-editor by the Department of Parliamentary Debates
for the State of Victoria. Ms Schou had two young children, the younger
of whom was an asthmatic. She had entered into an individual workplace
contract with her employer, which had guaranteed to promote ‘flexible
and progressive work practices and reasonable changes in the way work
is organised’. This acknowledgment of her lack of freedom and
independence was designed to help ensure a modicum of equality at
work for her, an important dimension of active citizenship. Nevertheless,
her attempts to negotiate part-time work were unsuccessful. Instead,
Ms Schou sought to work from home for two days per week when
parliament was sitting, because of the long hours, in order to
accommodate her childcare responsibilities. It was believed that the
arrangement could be facilitated by the provision of a fax and a modem.
Initially, the Department agreed to the arrangement but then failed to
provide the necessary equipment. Ms Schou resigned and lodged a
discrimination complaint under the Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic)
(hereinafter EOA). She succeeded initially, not on the ground of sex,
but on the ostensibly gender-neutral ground of parental status or status
as a carer.13
The focus of the complaint was one of indirect discrimination, based
on the effect of the requirement or condition that employees carry out
their work at the worksite. Unsurprisingly, the tribunal found that a
higher proportion of the population who did not have the status of
parent or carer could comply with the requirement. The nub of the
case, as with most indirect discrimination complaints, turned, not on
proportionality but on the meaning of reasonableness (see for example
Secretary Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade v Styles at 63 per
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Bowen CJ & Gummow J). If an employee can do the job properly at
home with the appropriate facilities, is it reasonable to require her to
be physically present in the workplace?
Initially, the tribunal found that the requirement that the complainant should carry out her work in the workplace was not reasonable,
and she was awarded more than A$160,000 for economic loss (Schou
2000). However, this was by no means the end of the matter, for the
outcome was hotly contested by the State of Victoria. In the first of two
appeals to the Supreme Court, Harper J held that the tribunal erred in
focusing the reasonableness question on Ms Schou’s use of the modem and ability to work from home for part of the week (Schou 2001).
He was of the opinion that insufficient attention had been paid to the
assessment of reasonableness from the employer’s perspective, that is,
the requirement that Ms Schou attend the worksite at Parliament
House.14 The case was remitted to the tribunal, which affirmed its original decision (Schou 2002), but the State appealed again. Phillips JA,
writing the majority opinion for the Court of Appeal, endorsed the
finding of Harper J, observing that he found it ‘almost inconceivable
that the attendance requirement for sub-editors to attend the house on
sitting days should be regarded as not reasonable’ (Schou 2004: §24).
Thus, the challenge to employer prerogative becomes the focus of
the Schou case. Just imagine what it would mean for the concept of
female agency and independence if millions of women wanted to work
from home in an unsupervised and ‘unmanned’ capacity? The question of discrimination is accorded short shrift. What is seen to be special consideration — being present for a child with a chronic condition
— is understood by masculinist judges to constitute a lesser claim than
upholding managerial prerogative. It would seem that their homosocial
world is devoted to protecting dominant social norms, including those
that prevail within the workplace (cf Adams 2002: 99). More significantly, I suggest that the effect of Schou is to undermine discursively
the propulsion in favour of substantive equality between the sexes.
It is also notable that the relevant anti-discrimination legislation is
the creature of the State, which was itself the respondent that so trenchantly opposed Ms Schou’s complaint. Furthermore, the majority judge,
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Phillips J, appeared to be openly hostile to the anti-discrimination jurisdiction, averring that the dispute was a matter for management, not
a complaint of indirect discrimination (Schou 2004: §33). The cost and
psychological burden for individual complainants in mounting challenges of this kind operate to maintain the status quo by deterring others from lodging complaints. The inequality between Ms Schou, the
individual complainant, and the State respondent in terms of resources,
legal representation and access to the appellate process was dramatic.15
The Schou case confronts head-on the line of demarcation between
public and private life which is central to liberal theory and the constitution of the nation-state. Moreover, whether we look at discourses
pertaining to citizenship, economics or law, the universal is an abstraction that has been deployed for the exclusive benefit of Benchmark
Men. Attempts to accommodate the particularity and the embodiment
associated with the feminine and the private sphere have been trenchantly resisted. The mandate of anti-discrimination legislation pays lip
service to new understandings of gender equality through the objects
clauses of the Acts (eg Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), s3, EOA
(Vic), s3), and through the inclusion of the grounds of pregnancy and
parental responsibility. However, actual attempts to alter the ambit of
operation of the non-discrimination principle falter and stumble. Cases,
such as Schou (cf Hickie v Hunt, Bogle v Metropolitan Health Service
Board), permit an oblique glimpse of ‘private’ life, not a major interrogation of it, because judicial attention is deflected by the complex legalistic test relating to indirect discrimination. Beth Gaze, in her critique of the first Supreme Court decision in the Schou case, attacks the
somewhat feeble attempt by judges, such as Harper J, to come to grips
with equality and anti-discrimination law (2002: 351).
However, it is not really surprising that the traditional sentinels of
the boundary between public and private life are so resistant to the
radical potential of the non-discrimination principle. In light of the
trajectory of ‘letting women in’ to public and professional life that I
have outlined, this metaphysical boundary has now become a major
site of contestation. The reality is that technology has revolutionised
the nature of work so that it is no longer necessary to remain in a fixed
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location (although this can be a mixed blessing). The stakes are high,
for the challenge goes to the heart of liberal theory and the gendered
Kantian dichotomy between passive and active citizens, which has the
potential to threaten the comfortable life world of Benchmark Men —
not just in terms of the gendered notion of managerial prerogative within
the workplace, but also the gendered division of labour within the
family.
The conundrum of care
The fundamental citizenship question pertaining to the public/private
symbiosis, on which relatively little headway has been made, as Schou
suggests, relates to the valuation of women’s work in the home. Marilyn
Waring has argued compellingly that this work counts for nothing in
the computation of the Gross National Product and other internationally recognised indices (Waring 1988). Work performed for ‘love and
affection’ is characterised as economically unproductive. The significance of this not only serves to diminish the social value of caring for
others, but it also operates to prevent women acquiring property, which
Rousseau referred to as the ‘true foundation of civil society’ (1979:
151). The classical liberal position was that those who did not own
property could not be free and independent. They were effectively denied legal personality and their wills deemed to be defective by virtue
of this lack; they could not be possessive individuals (Davies & Naffine
2001: 15). Women may no longer be automatically assigned to Kant’s
passive category, but one of the reasons why active citizenship remains
elusive is because the work they do in the home continues to be characterised as unproductive. While the commodification of that which is
done for love and affection is problematic, the linkage between property and active citizenship in a capitalist society is indubitable. There
is an inchoate recognition of caring work on relationship breakdown,
but it has not crystallised into active citizenship. As Jocelyn Pixley
compellingly argues, the opportunity to engage in paid employment is
a basic condition of being a citizen in contemporary society (1993, cf
Lister 2003: 138ff).
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If women are able to combine paid work with pregnancy, motherhood and caring responsibilities as a result of maternity leave and flexible work policies (Sex Discrimination Commissioner 1999), they acquire citizenship capital. However, the struggle to do so continues to
be contested. The consistent refusal to recognise child care expenses
as a legitimate work-related deduction for income tax purposes underscores the role of the nation-state in maintaining a gendered
conceptualisation of citizenship.16 ‘Working mums’ are treated as transient workers with little commitment to the workplace (Charlesworth
1999). The inference is that they also have little commitment to the
public sphere. As suggested, requiring employers to take cognisance
of what is still conceptualised as an employee’s private responsibilities, such as caring for a chronically sick child, as in the Schou case,
would be a radical step, despite the inchoate attempt by anti-discrimination legislation to do so. But even more radical would be the recognition of a direct linkage between unpaid caring work and active citizenship (Lister 2003: esp 167ff). We are reminded once again that the
and in ‘women and citizenship’ remains highly gendered.

Conclusion: Rapunzel goes to war
Finally, I would like to question the meaning of citizenship itself in a
neoliberal climate where social justice has virtually disappeared from
the public agenda. Contemporary politics have moved away from an
inclusive ideal of collectivism and common good to one that prioritises
the interests and desires of individuals. The site in which these interests are pursued has also moved — from civil society to the market.
Thus, current debates over paid maternity leave and flexible work are
more likely to be couched in terms of the cost to the employer than
equity and social justice for women. Individuals as market players are
careless of the needs of others, although neoliberals propound the rhetoric of the free market as a maximiser of overall societal well-being
(McCluskey 2003: 787). The focus is not just on the subjectivity of the
self and the satisfaction of individual desire, but the maximisation of
profits. Within a market discourse, competition is all-important which
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means that inequality, as well as equality, between citizens is an undeniable social norm.17 This has occurred by stealth because the growing
inequities are unseeable within the universalising rhetoric of citizenship. As I have already argued, the totalising and repressive tendencies
of the universal smothers the Other, thereby allowing the citizen definition that comports best with that of Benchmark Man to prevail. Similarly, the demise of social liberalism, after our brief flirtation with it,
means that it is once again harder for the voices of women and racialised
Others to be heard.
In Marshall’s typology, social citizenship was identified as the third
stage of citizenship, after civil and political rights (1950). Social citizenship encompasses material rights, including rights to education,
health and employment, but even then, the notion of rights, rather than
privileges, was contentious, particularly for women (eg Sarvasy 1997).
Under neoliberalism, there has been a resiling from social citizenship
and the possibility of material rights, in favour of a re-instantiation of
merely abstract rights. Thus, the nation-state will create the framework
for the acquisition of social goods, such as education, but individuals
will take responsibility for their own education by assuming the cost
themselves (Chapman 2004).
Civil society, the metaphysical space where citizens are free to
congregate, associate and debate, has withered under neoliberalism.
So pronounced is this trend that we are now encountering phrases,
such as the ‘death of the social’ (Rose 1996). Rather than public goods,
regulation and accountability, neoliberalism favours privatisation,
deregulation and secrecy. Instead of the Aristotelian notion of the good
life, which was traditionally pursued through the public sphere on behalf
of the common weal, the pursuit of private gain is privileged above all
else. For the most part, this means that neoliberal citizens, men as well
as women, are valued for their ‘use value’ — as either new knowledge
workers or consumers — not as citizens in their own right (Lyotard
1984, Brett 2003: 166–8). A range of neoliberal policies, such as
enterprise bargaining, contractualism and casualisation, have also had
a deleterious impact on low paid, indigenous and NESB (non English
speaking background) women workers. Collective movements,
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including women’s groups and unions, have dramatically declined in
membership. What do the principles of equality and non-discrimination
mean in this context? To be treated as equally badly as everyone else?
As a corollary of the changed mindset, neoliberalism has also seen
a resiling from the gains of Second Wave Feminism, which are very
much associated with the social liberalism of the 1970s and 1980s (eg
Cossman & Fudge 2002, Hunter 2002). Since the election of conservative Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, in 1996, there has been
a devastating reversal of policies designed to benefit Australian women
at the federal level (Whip 2003: 81–6, Summers 2003: esp 121–41).
They include severe budget cuts to the Office of Status of Women,
increased child care costs, the abolition of bodies designed to enhance
the representation and profile of women, including the Register of
Women, and the watering down of Affirmative Action (Equal Opportunity for Women) Act 1986 (Cth), now Equal Opportunity for Women
in the Workplace Act 1999 (Cth) (Thornton 2001a). A particularly bizarre illustration of the changed orientation, with its contempt, not just
its disregard, for women, is provided by the fact that a 12-person delegation to an International Labor Organization conference on pregnancy and the workplace held at Geneva in 2001, led by the then Minister for Industrial Relations, Senator Reith, did not include a single
woman (Whip 2003: 85).
The discourse of citizenship is also being changed by globalisation
and events on the world stage. Neoliberalism has seen a withdrawal of
funding for public goods, such as health and education, and a diversion to militarism, defence, security, border protection, and the incarceration of refugees. The latter cluster underscores most vividly the
line of demarcation between those who are in and those who are outside but want to be let in to the community of citizens. War and other
manifestations of state-legitimated violence serve to revive the militarist norms that have underpinned citizenship since Antiquity (Young
1989: 253). Throughout history, able-bodied male citizens have had
the responsibility of defending the state and protecting women and
children. In this way, gender has been historically mapped onto the
active/passive binary of citizenship discourse. The post-World War II
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period of economic growth and the ascendancy of social liberalism,
with its egalitarian rhetoric, blurred the starkness of the dichotomy,
but the contemporary discourses of war, terrorism and border protection invariably operate to revive the Kantian construction. The reversal
has also suited the moral conservatism of neoliberalism.
While a small number of women now participate in the defence
forces, the televising of the war in Iraq in 2003 reminded us on a daily
basis of the masculinist character of military service. Only one woman
received extensive media coverage in the West — Private Jessica Lynch
of the US army.18 Her story represents another piece of the mosaic of
women and citizenship. It is a modern variation of the fairytale of
Rapunzel, who was locked in a tower and had to be heroically rescued.19 Private Lynch, also young, blond and beautiful, was captured
in an ambush by Iraqi soldiers and then dramatically rescued by United
States commandoes — not on white chargers — but in Black Hawk
helicopters. Not only did this contemporary version of the fairytale
receive worldwide media coverage, it was soon made into a film that
was shown on prime-time television.20 The publication of a massively
promoted biography/autobiography (Bragg 2003) was also timed to
coincide with the showing of the film. It thereby instantiated in popular culture the tale of hapless maiden rescued from a terrible fate by
valiant heroes.
Private Lynch’s presence within the theatre of war threatened to
disrupt the conventional gendered binarism of citizenship, but the account of her rescue served to reify it at the very point of challenge. We
subsequently learned that the account of the rescue itself contained
fairytale elements — devised for the American propaganda machine,
as well as for the titillation of the consumers of popular culture, but
this was of little consequence. Indeed, Jessica Lynch’s doctors found
that she had no recollection of the events and probably never would.
The fabrication acquired its own ‘truth’ via the mediation of ‘reality
TV’ and the ‘autobiography’. The Jessica Lynch story illustrates
Baudrillard’s proposition that the ‘hyperreal’ does indeed become the
‘real’, that is, more real than the real, so that ‘the reality of the world is
a total illusion’ (1987: 44).
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‘Rapunzel goes to war’ is therefore an apt metaphor with which to
conclude my brief consideration of a further moment in women’s ongoing struggle to become active citizens. It completely disrupts a linear narrative of progress. Liberal feminists initially sought to be ‘let in’
on the same terms as men to demonstrate that they too possessed free
will, independence and agency. They were anxious to slough off the
stereo-typical straitjackets of passivity, but they underestimated the
pitfalls of equality — even when they were on the same side. Rather
than being respected for their competence, they continued to be constructed as Others. If they could not be contained in the private realm,
judges, employers, colleagues and comrades would seek to diminish
their independence by trivialising, corporealising or paternalistically
protecting and rescuing them. If legal and political discourses did not
succeed in denying women’s subjectivity, their stories would be rewritten in order to construct a new reality. The path to active citizenship is akin to manoeuvring through a minefield.
Nevertheless, if Rapunzel wishes to go to war, we must let her go.
We cannot construct a complementary totalising stereotype, which avers
that all women are morally superior, caring, and committed to peace
and the protection of life. Rapunzel is entitled to choose her own path
of self-realisation now that she has been released from to the tower.
The choices open to her represent an ostensibly significant advance
over the rigidity of exclusion associated with the Kantian binarism.
However, the Rapunzel metaphor underscores the ideologically laden
nature of those choices for women, which suggests that citizenship is
likely to continue to be a contested site of gender politics.

Notes
1

Versions of this paper were presented at the 32nd Triennial Conference,
Australian Federation of University Women, Melbourne, April 2003; St
John’s College, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, October 2003;
Socio-Legal Research Centre, Griffith Law School, Brisbane, September
2004. Warm thanks are extended to Catherine Dauvergne and Wes Pue for
inviting me to participate in the Challenging Nation Speaker Series and for
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arranging financial support, to Marian Quartly who organised the AFUW
Conference and to Pam Adams, Richard Johnstone, Bill MacNeil, Jan
McDonald and Steven White who organised my trip to Griffith Law School.
2

‘By marriage the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very
being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or
at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband; under
whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs every thing.’ (Blackstone
1765–9 [1979]: 442).

3

‘Benchmark Men’ is a shorthand term I coined to encapsulate the idea of
the normative comparator in discrimination complaints (Thornton 2001a:
78).

4

Senator Dorothy Tangney was elected to the Senate in the same year.

5

Judith Brett, in her study of the Australian Liberal Party, suggests that the
private sphere engendered a somewhat different conceptualisation of citizenship. The evangelical religion and middle class morality that shaped
the origins of the Party formed a bridge between civic virtue and domestic
life. Brett suggests that the connection of public and private spheres in this
way facilitated the attainment of formal citizenship for women (2003: 59–
60).

6

Public Notaries Act 1859 (SA).

7

Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA). The impediment arising from sex was
legislatively cured by the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act 1921 (SA).

8

Nicely encapsulated by Lasch’s phrase ‘a haven in a heartless world’ (1995).

9

Scott uses this term to capture the ‘critique of power spoken behind the
back of the dominant’ that initially cannot be avowed without reprisal (1990:
xii).

10 The view is that a specific legislative amendment is deemed to be necessary in each State to give effect to the ruling and alter what is, after all, a
creation of the common law. The Victorian Attorney-General announced
that the law would be abolished in Victoria, although Ms De Sales’ attempts to have the law changed in Western Australia were unsuccessful
(Munro 2003).
11 The Fatal Accidents Act 1959 (WA), like the UK model generally emulated in Australia, is designed to compensate relatives for economic loss,
not for grief: ‘Historically, the paradigm case under the Fatal Accidents
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Act was a claim by a dependent wife for damages arising from the death of
her husband, who was the family breadwinner.’ (De Sales §12 per Gleeson
CJ).
12 Some of the more bizarre examples induced by a comparability requirement that arose in early United States sex discrimination litigation, such as
those dealing with male medical analogies to pregnancy (Geduldig v Aiello
per Brennan J), have been obviated in Australia by the inclusion of express
legislative proscriptions of discrimination on the ground of pregnancy.
13 Australia ratified ILO Convention No 156: Workers with Family Responsibilities in 1990. In 1992, the ground of family responsibilities was included as a proscribed ground within the Sex Discrimination Act 1984
(Cth). All States and territories, except South Australia, now include parental status, or a cognate term, as a ground in their anti-discrimination
legislation: Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW), s49(s); EOA (Vic), s6(1);
Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld), s7(1)(d); Equal Opportunity Act 1984
(WA), s35A; Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas), s16(i); Discrimination
Act 1991 (ACT), s7(1)(e); Anti-Discrimination Act 1992 (NT), s19(1)(g).
14 The legal test is concerned with the disparate effect on the complainant of
not permitting her to work from home rather than with the denial of a
favour not granted to other employees. Harper J conceptualises the test as
one of comparability that relates to direct, not indirect, discrimination. As
Gaze also points out, Harper J paid scant attention to what assistance might
be gleaned from the relevant case law (2002: 349, cf Adams 2002).
15 The complainant wished to appeal to the High Court from the Court of
Appeal decision. A law firm was prepared to act for her in a pro bono
capacity provided that the State undertook not to seek costs if Ms Schou
were unsuccessful, but the State was not prepared to give this undertaking.
16 For a detailed analysis of the issue of childcare as a tax deduction, see
Johnson 2002. While Johnson’s study is based on a late 20th century Canadian Supreme Court case, Symes v Canada, litigation in common law
jurisdictions, in which courts oppose the deduction, has a long lineage.
See, eg, Bowers v Harding (UK), Henry C & Lillie M Wright v Commissioner (US), No 68 v Minister of National Revenue (Can), Lodge v Federal
Commissioner of Taxation (Aust).
17 Summers’ analysis of anti-feminist policies associated with the millennial
turn is not analysed in the context of neoliberalism as such, but the title of
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her study, The End of Equality (2003), is particularly apt.
18 The ambush and wounding occurred on 23 March, and the rescue on 1
April 2003 (Wright 2003).
19 Judith Grbich uses the Rapunzel fairytale in her imaginative reading of the
film, Pretty Woman, as a metaphor for property law theory (2002).
20 Saving Jessica Lynch was shown on US and Canadian TV on 9 November
2003.
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